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Abstract. Recently, Canetti and Krawczyk (Eurocrypt’2001) formulated a notion of security for key-exchange (ke) protocols, called SKsecurity, and showed that this notion suffices for constructing secure channels. However, their model and proofs do not suffice for proving more general composability properties of SK-secure ke protocols. We show that while the notion of SK-security is strictly weaker than a fully-idealized notion of key exchange security, it is sufficiently robust for providing secure composition with arbitrary protocols. In particular, SK-security guarantees the security of the key for any application that desires to set-up secret keys between pairs of parties. We also provide new definitions of secure-channels protocols with similarly strong composability properties, and show that SK-security suffices for obtaining these definitions. To obtain these results we use the recently proposed framework of “universally composable (UC) security. ” We also use a new tool, called “noninformation oracles, ” which will probably find applications beyond the present case. These tools allow us to bridge between seemingly limited indistinguishability-based definitions such as SK-security and more powerful, simulation-based definitions, such as UC security, where general composition theorems can be proven. Furthermore, based on such composition theorems we reduce the analysis of a full-fledged multi-session keyexchange protocol to the (simpler) analysis of individual, stand-alone, key-exchange sessions.
- In Notion, recurring tasks can be a challenge. The notion app does have some ways to do recurring events or repeating tasks but it is not ideal.
- Get to know Shango SK, the Manchester musician with his sights set on global domination. Radiating positive energy from the minute he steps in the door, Shango SK is an incredibly motivated up-and-comer who plans to be one of the biggest artists this world has ever seen.
Theory Skate Shop
Recently, I started using Notion to track my habits. An idea that I originally built on Excel. But I decided to switch to Notion (because Excel is slow) and I wanted to access my habit tracking from the browser. Today, I will sha r e my steps on how to create your own habit tracker. Let’s check this out.